

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

<i>Test Number</i>
EA1-P3 - 101

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2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number	
<b>Rule or Statute</b> 45.5.2.1.2(g); 11-5-4	The Voting system shall provide for appropriately authorized operators to conduct the post election audit as required herein.	EA1-P3-101	
		<b>Test Date</b> 7-17-07	
		<b>Test End Date/Time</b> 8-02-07	
<b>Cross Reference 1</b>		<b>Test Type (D,F,B)</b> Functional	
		<b>Eq Type</b> DRE	
<b>Cross Reference 2</b> 2002 VSS 6.2.1.1		<b>Equipment Model</b> AccuVote TSX	
		<b>Serial number</b>	
<b>Cross Reference 3</b>		<b>Manufacturer</b> Diebold	
<b>Test Procedure Specification</b>			
<div> <div> <b><u>Purpose:</u></b>            The purpose of this test is to allow only authorized operators to conduct the post election audit.         </div> <div> <b><u>Prerequisites:</u></b>            DB1-P3-101         </div> </div>			
<div> <div> <b><u>Test Procedures:</u></b>  <del>Follow procedures in DB1-P3-101,</del>            Follow procedures in DB1-P3-101, close polls (insert a supervisor card and enter password). Insert an Administrator card to access view/voted Ballots.         </div> <div> <b><u>Variances Used During Testing:</u></b> </div> </div>			
<b>Test Expected Outcome</b> The voting system allows only authorized operators to conduct the post election audit.			







## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*




[illegible]

[illegible]

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Doc 1				1-3	

*Acceptable Compensating Controls*

Results Summary:		Final Test Status
Meets test expected outcome		✓

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisor Approval	
Genevieve Mathews		T.B. 540f		L. GARONCE	
Printed name		Printed name		Printed name	
	8-7-07		8-14-07		8/15/07
Signature	Date	Signature	Date	Signature	Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

**Observations:**

See log

**Findings:**

Voting system allows only authorized <sup>GCM</sup> ~~operator~~ operators to conduct the post election audit on the DRE

1st Review


Genevieve Mathews  
Printed name

  
Signature

8-7-07  
Date

2nd Review


T. Bishop  
Printed name

  
Signature



8-15-07  
Date

Supervisor Approval

Ida Gardner  
Printed name

  
Signature

8/15/07  
Date



8-7-07 EAI-P3-101 Photo 2

## PRE-ELECTION MODE

Colorado Certification  
Coordinated Election  
November 7, 2006

Rudy Elementary School

Please touch one of the buttons below to select an option.

## Testing

Test Vote

Logic & Accuracy

Create Voter Cards

## Result Management

Print Election Results

Accumulator

Provisional Ballots

View Voted Ballots

Upload Results

Clear Results



## VIEW VOTED BALLOTS

Colorado Certification  
Recall Election  
November 7, 2006

Absentee

Machine 1

ID	Precinct	Portion
015153	7202330002	7202330002
016568	2192930022	2192930022
017139	7192730019	7192730019-1
023562	2192930022	2192930022
025947	2192930022	2192930022
036347	6222830010	6222830010-1
037398	7212230008	7212230008-1
042591	2162930001	2162930001
042971	6162530001	6162530001-1
043407	6222230003	6222230003
044124	7202330002	7202330002
045833	6222530001	6222530001-1
046144	2232930001	2232930001
051027	7212230008	7212230008-1
054826	6222830010	6222830010-1
068951	1320130001	1320130001
069500	7202330002	7202330002
070674	7202330002	7202330002
075378	6222530001	6222530001-1
093305	2192930022	2192930022
099527	7202330002	7202330002
108731	2192930022	2192930022
109288	7192430001	7192430001
110001	7212230008	7212230008-1
110465	6222230003	6222230003
126076	7192730019	7192730019-1
137959	7192730019	7192730019-1
139229	7192430001	7192430001
141171	7212230008	7212230008-1

Colorado Certification Recall

7192730019

7192730019-1

1

Question 1a Should School Dis.

[X] YES &lt;NP&gt;

Question 1b Should the recall...

[X] Charlie Bobbit &lt;NP&gt;

Print All

Close



## 5. Election Support

---

### 5.1. Smart cards

There are three different types of access cards: voter access cards, Supervisor cards, and Central Administrator cards. voter access cards are encoded by pollworkers, given to voters, used once, and then returned to the pollworkers. Once a ballot has been cast with a voter access card, the card is deactivated and needs to be re-encoded with ballot information before it can be reused.

Supervisor cards are given to designated pollworkers and used to exit the Official Election screen and access the pollworker functions, such as encoding voter access cards. Supervisor cards are also used to end voting on the AccuVote-TSX unit at the end of an election.

Central Administrator cards can be used by election administrators to access the administrative menu interface. They may also be used in lieu of a pollworker card to access pollworker functions, but it is not recommended that Administrator cards be distributed to pollworkers. Both Supervisor cards and voter access cards are required on election day.

#### 5.1.1. Encoding voter access cards

Voter access cards are purchased from Diebold Election Systems and supplied to pollworkers by election officials. Voter access cards allow voters to vote on the AccuVote-TSX units. Pollworkers are generally responsible for encoding these voter access cards on election day.

##### 5.1.1.1. *Encoding voter access cards on the AccuVote-TSX unit*

To create voter access cards:

- Enter the Supervisor card into the AccuVote-TSX unit
- Enter the password
- Remove the Supervisor card when prompted to do so
- On the Election Interrupt screen, press the Create Voter Cards button to access the Create Cards screen.

**CREATE CARDS**

CONSOLIDATED ELECTIONS, November 04, 2003  
Los Angeles County

**LAKE LINDERO COUNTRY CLUB**

**\*\* BLANK CARD INSERTED \*\***

Precinct	Party
0080034A - AGOURA HILLS - 0080001A	Nonpartisan
<b>13.10 - AGOURA HILLS - 0080034A - AGOURA HILLS</b>	<b>AGOURA HILLS</b>
<b>13.20 - AGOURA HILLS - 0080034A - AGOURA HILLS</b>	

**Filter Options**

Category:  
Polling

**Voter Card Options**

☐ Audio Ballot    ☐ Hide Ballot    ☐ Magnify Display

☐ Provisional   

Description Text: AGOURA H.011

Create Card    Eject Card    Close

SN: 0000001 MID: 0 Ballots: 00000 Tot: 0000079

**Figure 5-1. Create Cards screen**

- Insert a voter access card into the smart card reader. If the voter access card is incorrectly inserted, the operator is prompted to insert the voter access card in the proper orientation.
- If the card is already encoded, the Create Card button will change to Clear Card. Touch the Clear Card button to clear all data on the encoded voter access card before re-encoding.
- Select the desired precinct. For a primary election, select a party from the Party column as well.
- Verify that the Description Text field matches the precinct or precinct/party combination selected.
- For audio ballots, select the Audio Ballot check box.
- Select the Hide Ballot check box to suppress the visual display while voting the audio ballot.
- Select the Magnify check box to display the visual ballot with magnification.
- For provisional voter access cards, select the Provisional check box.
- To encode a voter access card for a provisional ballot, enter the provisional voter ID in the ID field using the keypad (activated by touching the electronic keypad icon). Provisional ID must be non-zero. It is not possible to encode multiple voter access cards on any AccuVote-TS unit with the same Provisional ID.
- Touch the Create Card button.



- Once the voter access card has been encoded, remove the encoded voter access card and continue encoding voter access cards.
- When all voter access cards have been encoded, touch the Close button in the Create Voter Access Card screen.
- To remove a voter access card without encoding it, touch the Eject Card button to eject the card from the smart card reader.

When you have finished creating voter access cards, touch the Close button to return to the Pollworker Screen. If you are also using this AccuVote-TSX unit for voting, then press the Resume Voting button.

#### **5.1.1.2. Voter Card Options**

When creating a voter access card, the Voter Card Options on the Create Cards screen can be used to specify the following:

**Audio Ballot:** Creates an audio ballot. An audio ballot is normally played through the headphones and voted via numeric keypad.

**Hide Ballot:** This option is only available when Audio Ballot is selected. Selecting both Audio Ballot and Hide Ballot creates an audio ballot with no visual display on the screen.

**Magnify Display:** Creates a standard ballot whose visual display is magnified.

**Provisional:** Creates a Provisional ballot.

#### **Audio Ballots:**

The Create Cards screen can be used to create Audio ballots.

To create an audio ballot, touch the Audio Ballot checkbox. If you would like this ballot to be hidden, leave the Hide Ballot checkbox selected, as it will be by default when Audio Ballot is selected.

To display the audio ballot in normal text, deselect the Hide Ballot option. To display an audio ballot with magnified text, select Audio Ballot, then deselect the Hide Ballot option and select the Magnify Display checkbox.

#### **Provisional Ballot:**

When creating a Provisional Ballot, a unique Provisional Voter ID needs to be entered. Select the Provisional checkbox and then touch the keyboard icon. Then type in a unique Provisional Voter ID code.

## **5.2. How voting works**

Unlike with paper ballots, ballots on the AccuVote-TSX are automatically configured to the voting rules. In other words, the voter cannot over vote a race. For example, if voting a preference race, the races available to vote will be influenced by the party selected in the preference race; unlike with paper ballots, other races will not be displayed. If voting a straight party race, then party candidates will automatically be selected (and can be de-selected with votes changed, if desired).

**Note:** There are settings in GEMS that affect layout and function of ballots displayed on the AccuVote-TSX. Information you include in your Pollworker's guide will depend on the options you have selected in your GEMS database. Please see the *Ballot Station 4.6. User's Guide* for descriptions of these settings.

The examples in this guide show ballots configured with the default settings in GEMS.

Vote the ballot as follows:

- The voter inserts the voter access card until it clicks.

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*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EA2-P3 - 201

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Documents		Videos		Attachments		Photos	
(list all documents)	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	(list all videos)	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	(list all attachments)	No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(list all photos)	No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
						SEE ATTACHED	

## Acceptable Compensating Controls

Results Summary	Final Test Status
Test Meets Expected Outcome <i>Hand</i>	PASS <i>Hand</i>

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisor Approval	
<u>Michael L. Cordwell</u>		<u>T.B. 5460</u>		<u>John Gardner</u>	
Printed name		Printed name		Printed name	
<u>Michael L. Cordwell</u>	<u>8.08.07</u>	<u>Jim Riney</u>	<u>8-14-07</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>8/14/07</u>
Signature	Date	Signature	Date	Signature	Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

The Voting System Provides A method for Restricted users to enter Supervisor functions & Process the Post Election Audit.  
Chad

### Findings:

The Voting System Meets the expected Requirements.  
Chad

1st Review

Michael L. Cronwell  
Printed name

Michael L. Cronwell  
Signature

8.08.07  
Date

2nd Review

T. Bishop  
Printed name

T. Bishop  
Signature

8-14-07  
Date

Supervisor Approval

John Gardner  
Printed name


John Gardner  
Signature

8/14/07  
Date




























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*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

<i>Test Number</i>
EA3-P3 - 301

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2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number
<b>Rule or Statute</b> 45.5.2.1.2(g); 11-5-4	The Voting system shall provide for appropriately authorized operators to conduct the post election audit as required herein.	EA3-P3-301
		<b>Test Date</b> 8-7-07
		<b>Test End Date/Time</b> 8-7-07
<b>Cross Reference 1</b>		<b>Test Type (D/F/B)</b> Functional
		<b>Eq. Type</b> CCOS
<b>Cross Reference 2</b>		<b>Equipment Model</b> OS 2.0.12
		<b>Serial number</b> 40882
<b>Cross Reference 3</b>		<b>Manufacturer</b> Diebold
<b>Test Procedure Specification</b>		
<div> <div> <b>Purpose:</b>            The purpose of this test is to allow only authorized operators to conduct the post election audit.         </div> <div> <b>Prerequisites:</b>            Election data for predetermined / marked ballots.         </div> </div>		
<div> <div> <b>Test Procedures:</b>            ① Login as Admin            ② Create backup of db            ③ Load backup of db            ④ Reset election totals            ⑤ Process audited ballots.         </div> <div> <b>Variances Used During Testing:</b> </div> </div>		
<b>Test Expected Outcome</b> The voting system allows only authorized operators to conduct the post election audit.		







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
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Attachments		
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<b>Photos</b> <i>(list all photos)</i>	<b>No</b> <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Yes</b> <input type="checkbox"/>

### Acceptable Compensating Controls

\_\_\_\_\_

Results Summary	Final Test Status
Meets test expected outcome	P

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisor Approval	
Genevieve Mathews		T. Bishop		John GARDNER	
Printed name		Printed name		Printed name	
	8-7-07		8-14-07		8/14/07
Signature	Date	Signature	Date	Signature	Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

**Observations:**

See log

**Findings:**

Voting system only allows an administrator user to conduct the post election audit.

**1st Review**

Geneice Mathews  
Printed name

**2nd Review**

T Bishop  
Printed name

**Supervisor Approval**

John GARONCE  
Printed name

Gene Mathews  
Signature

8-7-07  
Date

T Bishop  
Signature

8-14-07  
Date

John GARONCE  
Signature

8/14/07  
Date

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*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EA4-P3 - 401

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*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

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[illegible]

Attachments		
<b>Documents</b> (list all documents)	No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Videos</b> (list all videos)	No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Photos</b> (list all photos)	No <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>

Acceptable Compensating Controls

\_\_\_\_\_

Results Summary		Final Test Status
		P

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisory Approval	
<u>T Bishop</u>		<u>Michael L. Cardwell</u>		<u>John Gardner</u>	
Printed name		Printed name		Printed name	
<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>8-7-07</u>	<u>Michael L. Cardwell</u>	<u>8-15-07</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>8-15-07</u>
Signature	Date	Signature	Date	Signature	Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

Observations:

Voting procedure verified during tested tests.  
Voting systems user must have administrative  
privileges to reset or "zero" the election.  
The "resetting" or "zeroing" being a prerequisite to the audit process of allowing  
additional ballot runs to be verified.

Findings:

Voting system meets test requirements.

1st Review

2nd Review

Supervisor Approval

T Bishop  
Printed name

Michael L. CARDWELL  
Printed name

John GARDNER  
Printed name

T Bishop  
Signature

8-7-07  
Date

Michael L. Cardwell  
Signature

8-15-07  
Date

[Signature]  
Signature

8/15/07  
Date

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<i>Test Number</i>
EB1-P3 - 101

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<b>Rule or Statute</b>	<b>2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402</b>	<b>Test Number</b>
1-5-615(2)	The permanent paper record produced by the electronic or electromechanical voting system shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted for any election in which the system was used.	EB1-P3-101
		<b>Test Date</b>
		7-26-07
		<b>Test End Date/Time</b>
		8-07-07
<b>Cross Reference 1</b>		<b>Test Type (D,F,B)</b>
2005 VVSG 2.1.5.1a i		Functional
		<b>Eq Type</b>
		DRE
<b>Cross Reference 2</b>		<b>Equipment Model</b>
2002 VSS 2.2.5.1	AccuVote TSX	
	<b>Serial number</b>	
	297645	
<b>Cross Reference 3</b>	<b>Manufacturer</b>	
	Diebold	

#### Test Procedure Specification

##### Purpose:

The purpose of this test is to verify that the voting system will produce a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.

##### Prerequisites:

Reference test #  
DB3-P3-303  
DB1-P3-108

##### Test Procedures:

Reference test #  
DB3-P3-303  
DB1-P3-108

##### Variances Used During Testing:

Reference test #  
DB3-P3-303

#### Test Expected Outcome

The voting system devices will produce a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.

Environment		Post Election		2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number EB1-P3 - 101	
Test Log							
Date	Time	Operator	Activities and Entries			Incident Reports	
<del>7/26/07</del>		<del>[Signature]</del>	<del>Reference test # DB3-P3-303 See evidence bags</del>				
8/4	12:10	TARA	Reference DB1-P3-108 Recall Provisional				
			Attached pictures show 2 people hand-counting U-UPAT record. The second picture shows the hand tallies compared with the DRE summary report.				



## Test Log

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[illegible]





## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

Test is pass conditional based on the issue that ~~the~~ voter ballot records must be saved as set forth in Rule 11.6 and Rule 43.

### Findings:

Voting system device produces a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount. Paper Record must be stored as set forth in ~~the~~ Rule 11.6 that the paper be stored in a light sensitive containers.

1st Review

Genice Mathews  
Printed name

2nd Review

T Bishop  
Printed name


Supervisor Approval

John Gardner  
Printed name

Gen Mathews  
Signature Date 8/7/07

T Bishop  
Signature Date 8/14/07

John Gardner  
Signature Date 8/14/07



Picture 1

EBI-P3-101

10/4/18



1. NAME: [illegible]  
 2. ADDRESS: [illegible]  
 3. CITY: [illegible]  
 4. STATE: [illegible]  
 5. ZIP: [illegible]  
 6. PHONE: [illegible]  
 7. OCCUPATION: [illegible]  
 8. EDUCATION: [illegible]  
 9. MARITAL STATUS: [illegible]  
 10. NUMBER OF CHILDREN: [illegible]  
 11. DATE OF BIRTH: [illegible]  
 12. DATE OF DEATH: [illegible]  
 13. CAUSE OF DEATH: [illegible]  
 14. PLACE OF DEATH: [illegible]  
 15. DATE OF BURIAL: [illegible]  
 16. PLACE OF BURIAL: [illegible]  
 17. NAME OF FUNERAL HOME: [illegible]  
 18. NAME OF MINISTER: [illegible]  
 19. NAME OF CHURCH: [illegible]  
 20. NAME OF CEMETERY: [illegible]  
 21. NAME OF INTERVIEWER: [illegible]  
 22. DATE OF INTERVIEW: [illegible]  
 23. SIGNATURE: [illegible]  
 24. PRINTED NAME: [illegible]

Picture 2

EBI-P3-101

8/4/07

- 11.5.4.7 For Direct Electronic Devices (DREs) that do meet the requirement of section 1-5-802, C.R.S., used for any function of counting ballots in an election, after the close of the polls, the designated election official will manually verify all of the voter verified paper record produced with the report generated for that specific devices, which contains the election summary report. The Secretary of State shall randomly select two races to be manually verified.
- 11.5.4.8 The actions of the random audit as identified in this section are to be observed by at least two members of the canvass board. The designated election official may appoint additional deputized clerks to assist in the functions of the audit.
- 11.5.4.9 If there are discrepancies in the audit, the canvass board or the designated election official's deputized clerks shall:
- 11.5.4.9.1 First, manually verify the results as many times as necessary to confirm that there is no discrepancy in the manual count;
  - 11.5.4.9.2 Second, take any additional steps as necessary to check for voter error, which shall include but not be limited to: over-votes, stray marks on the ballot, or other voter intent indicia; and
  - 11.5.4.9.3 Third, review the situation and take action as necessary in accordance with the canvass board's powers as set forth in part 1 of Article 10 of Title 1 Colorado Revised Statutes.
- 11.5.4.10 At all times relevant to the Post-Election Audit, the designated election official or the deputized clerks or the canvass board shall take every precaution necessary to protect the confidentiality of the ballots cast by the electors.
- 11.5.4.11 Upon completion of the audit, the designated election official shall promptly report the results of the audit to the Secretary of State's Office. The report shall be submitted following the completion of the audit and up to and including 5:00 pm on the last day of the canvass. The report shall contain:
- (a) The make, model and serial number of the voting device that was audited.
  - (b) The number of ballots originally counted by the device or the number of ballots audited as identified in paragraph (d) of this section;
  - (c) The count of the specific race or races as provided on the summary report printed at the close of polls or the report generated for the audit;
  - (d) The count of the specific race as manually verified; and
  - (e) The signature of the canvass board and the designated election official.
- 11.5.4.12 The report may be sent by any of the following three methods: E-mail: voting.systems@sos.state.co.us; Subject line = County Number, County Name, POST-ELECTION AUDIT; or via facsimile to: 303-869-4861 attn: Secretary of State, Voting Systems Specialist; or via First Class Mail to Colorado Department of State/ Attn: Voting Systems Specialist/1700 Broadway – Suite 270/Denver, CO 80290.

11.6 Procedures for Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (V-VPAT)

#### 11.6.1 Security

- 11.6.1.1 The V-VPAT record is considered an official record of the election, pursuant to section 1-5-802. All security procedures related to election ballots shall apply to V-VPAT records.
- 11.6.1.2 The housing unit for any V-VPAT record to be used in the election shall be sealed and secured prior to any votes being cast for the election. Documentation of the seal number(s) must be maintained and noted prior to voting, and at the conclusion of voting.
  - (a) Election Judges shall attest to the V-VPAT record having no votes included on the paper record prior to the start of voting, and prior to the installation or replacement of a new V-VPAT record.
- 11.6.1.3 If a DRE with V-VPAT is used during early voting, the seal number(s) must be recorded at the beginning and end of each voting day.
- 11.6.1.4 At the Close of the polls, the V-VPAT records will be transferred to the central office in the same manner as any paper ballots. In the absence of paper ballots, the V-VPAT records will be transferred to the central office in the same manner as any memory cards containing electronic ballots.

#### 11.6.2 Anonymity

- 11.6.2.1 The Election Official shall put measures in place to protect the anonymity of voters choosing to vote on DREs during the voting periods. These measures shall include:
  - (a) Encouraging poll workers to personally vote on DREs when possible to ensure more than one vote will be cast on the device.
  - b) Appropriate marking in Poll Book or other voting list indicating voters choice to vote on DRE with the words: "Voted DRE", or similar in place of paper ballot information. No record shall be kept indicating the order in which people voted on the DRE, or which V-VPAT record is associated with the voter.
  - (c) When more than one DRE is available at a voting location, the voter shall be given the choice as to which DRE they would like to vote on, to the extent practical.
  - (d) Encouraging or allowing any and all voters the opportunity to vote on a DRE if desired.
- 11.6.2.2 Any report or export (electronic or paper based) generated from an Electronic Pollbook shall remove the date/time stamp from the record and not use this field as a sort method. Any assignment of Record IDs, Key ID, or Serial Number stored in the database of votes shall be randomly assigned.
- 11.6.2.3 Any Pollbook, electronic, paper or otherwise shall not be exposed to the same people at the same place who have exposure to the V-VPAT records.
- 11.6.2.4 The examination of the V-VPAT record shall always be done by at least two witnesses.

### 11.6.3 Storage

11.6.3.1 The storage of the V-VPAT records must be consistent with storage of Paper Ballots pursuant to section 1-7-802.

11.6.3.2 Individual spools containing V-VPAT records must contain the following catalog information affixed to the spool:

- (a) Date and Name of Election;
- (b) Name of Voting Location;
- (c) Date(s) and Time(s) of Voting;
- (d) Machine Serial Number of DRE Associated with the Record; and
- (e) Number of spools associated with this machine for this election (i.e. "Spool 1 of 1", or "Spool 1 of 2", etc.).

11.6.3.3 Light sensitive storage containers shall be used for the 25 month storage period to ensure the integrity of the V-VPAT paper record. Containers shall be sealed, with record of the seal numbers maintained on file and signed by two elections officials.

11.6.3.4 A master catalog shall be maintained for the election containing the complete total number of V-VPAT spools used in the election.

### 11.7 Escrow of County Election Setup

11.7.1 No later than 5:00pm on the seventh (7th) day prior to any election, the designated election official shall deposit a copy of the election setup records with the Secretary of State's office by mail.

11.7.2 Jurisdictions that have contracted with either a Software Service Bureau or a Vendor of Electronic Vote Counting Equipment may choose to have the necessary election setup records delivered to the Secretary of State's office within the specified time frame.

11.7.3 Election Setup Records shall be contained within an electronic media format that is native to the jurisdictions specific ballot creation and tabulation system. Acceptable media formats range from Tape, Diskette, Cartridge, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, Floppy, External Hard Drive, or Flash Media.

11.7.4 All copies of electronic media shall be sent to:

Colorado Secretary of State

Attn: Voting Systems Specialist

1700 Broadway – Suite 270

Denver, CO 80290

11.7.5 Jurisdictions will include a point of contact and method of contact (phone, fax, e-mail, etc.) to inform the jurisdiction that the Secretary of State's office has received the election setup records.

- 11.7.6 Within 24 hours of receipt of the election setup files, the Secretary of State or his or her designee will contact the jurisdiction to confirm receipt of the escrow files.
- 11.7.7 The Secretary of State's office will store the setup files in a secured, fire proof, limited access location or container.
- 11.7.8 All parties shall treat as confidential all escrowed materials and any other related information that comes into their possession, control or custody pursuant to this rule.
- 11.8 Escrow of Voting System Software by Voting System Provider
  - 11.8.1 Voting System Providers must place in escrow a copy of the election software and supporting documentation being certified with either the Secretary of State or an independent escrow agent approved by the Secretary of State. See section 1-7-511, C.R.S.
  - 11.8.2 Within ten days of the Voting System provider receiving notification of examination of voting equipment as part of the certification process, the Voting System Provider shall arrange for the completion of escrow requirements as indicated by this rule.
  - 11.8.3 Voting System Provider shall sign a sworn affidavit that the election software in escrow is the same as the election software used in its voting systems in this state. An annual update of the affidavit will be on file in a secured location with the Secretary of State's office.
  - 11.8.4 A complete copy of the certified election software including any and all subsystems of the certified software shall be maintained in escrow.
  - 11.8.5 Any changes to current configurations or new installations must be approved through the certification program of the Secretary of State.
  - 11.8.6 In addition to the requirements listed below, the Voting System Provider must include a cover/instructions sheet for any escrow material to include the Voting System Provider Name, Address and pertinent contact information, Software Version, Hardware Version, Firmware Revision Number and other uniquely identifying numbers of the software submitted for certification.
  - 11.8.7 Election Software Source Code, maintained in escrow, shall contain internal documentation such that a person reasonably proficient in the use of the programming language can efficiently use the documentation to understand the program structure, control techniques, and error processing logic in order to maintain the Source Code should it be removed from escrow for any reason.
  - 11.8.8 System documentation shall include instructions for converting the escrowed Source Code into Object Code, organized and configured to produce an executable system, if warranted.
  - 11.8.9 System documentation shall include technical architecture design, analysis, detail design, testing and an installation and configuration guide.
  - 11.8.10 A set of schematics and drawings on electronic vote casting and counting equipment purchased or in use by the county clerk and recorder shall be on file with the Secretary of State.

- ii. A seal is to be placed over any removable card or cartridge slot when no card or cartridge is inserted into the unit.
  - iii. Tamper-evident, numbered seals shall be affixed across the seam at which the two sides of the case of the electronic components of the voting unit join, with at least one seal for each of the four sides of the device.
  - iv. If the voting device contains one or more slots for a flash memory card, a seal shall be affixed over each flash card or each flash card slot, door, or access panel.
  - v. These same procedures also apply to the Judge's Booth Controller (JBC) unit for the Hart InterCivic System.
  - vi. All seals are to be verified by two employees or election judges.
- b. V-VPATs. all V-VPAT units shall be sealed upon verification of no votes having been cast on the paper record prior to being attached to a specific voting device. Seals must be verified as being intact by at least two election judges prior to the start of voting, and at the close of voting. V-VPAT records shall either remain in the V-VPAT canister, or be sealed and secured in a suitable device for protecting privacy or as described in Election Rule 11.
- c. Remote or Central-count Optical Scanners. Optical scanners used in a remote or central tabulating location shall have tamper-evident seals as follows:
- i. A seal is to be placed over each card or cartridge inserted into the unit, or over any door or slot containing the card or cartridge.
  - ii. A seal is to be placed over each empty card or cartridge slot or door covering the area where the card or cartridge is inserted.
  - ii. Prior to the start of voting and after the close of voting, all seals are to be verified as being intact by two employees or election judges.
- d. Memory Cards/Cartridges. Each removable card or cartridge shall have a permanent serial number assigned and securely affixed to it. The manufacturer assigned serial number may be utilized for this purpose.
- e. The county clerk and recorder shall maintain a written or electronic log that records which card or cartridge and which seal number is assigned to each voting unit. Any breach of control over a card/cartridge or door or slot for a card/cartridge before an election shall require that the county clerk and recorder be notified and follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in section 43.8.11 of this Rule.

#### 43.8.3 Individuals With Access to Keys, Door Codes, and Vault Combinations

- 43.8.3.1 Counties are required to state the positions and dates of CBI background check for employees with access to the areas addressed in this Rule 43.8.3.
- 43.8.3.2 For all counties, use of keypad door codes or locks, vault combinations, computer and server passwords, encryption key codes, and administrator passwords shall be changed at least once per calendar year prior to the first



election of the year. Only employees may be given access to such codes, combinations, passwords, and encryption keys, pursuant to the following limitations. Counties may request a variance from the Secretary of State for the requirements set forth in this Rule 43.8.3 only in extreme circumstances.

43.8.3.3 The requirements for an employee to be given access to a code, combination, password, or encryption key are as follows:

- a. Access to the storage area for voting equipment and the absentee ballot counting areas shall be restricted to employees as defined in Rule 43.1.4.
- b. Access to the absentee ballot storage area and counting room or tabulation workstations shall be restricted to ten (10) employees as defined in Rule 43.1.4.
- c. Except for emergency personnel, no other individuals shall be present in these locations unless supervised by one or more employees as defined in Rule 43.1.4.
  - i. Each individual who has access to the central election management system or central tabulator shall have their own unique username and password. No individual shall use any other individual's username or password. Shared accounts shall be prohibited.
  - ii. The county shall maintain a log of each person who enters the ballot storage room, including the person's name, signature, and date and time of entry. If access to the ballot storage room is controlled by use of key card or similar door access system that is capable of producing a printed paper log including the person's name and date and time of entry, such a log shall meet the requirements of this rule.

43.8.3.4 Computer room access shall be limited to employees and election judges only, and the delivery of ballots between the preparation room and computer room shall be performed by messengers or runners wearing distinguishing identification.

#### 43.8.4 Temperature-controlled Storage

43.8.4.1 Counties shall attest to the temperature-control settings used with the following components of a voting system. Information submitted to the Secretary of State shall indicate the specifics for each type of component, as well as the specific environment used, which may include, but is not limited to controlled offices, controlled vaults, and controlled warehouses. The settings for temperature control must be at least the following:

- a. Servers and Workstations. Servers and workstations shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. Maximum temperature shall at no time exceed 90 degrees fahrenheit.
- b. DREs. DREs shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. The temperature settings shall be maintained at a

minimum of 60 degrees fahrenheit and a maximum of 90 degrees fahrenheit.

- c. Optical Scanners. Optical scanners shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. The temperature settings shall be maintained at a minimum of 50 degrees fahrenheit and a maximum of 90 degrees fahrenheit.
- d. V-VPAT Records. In addition to the requirements set forth in Rule 11, V-VPAT records shall be maintained in a temperature-controlled environment. The temperature settings shall be maintained at a minimum of 50 degrees fahrenheit and a maximum of 80 degrees fahrenheit. V-VPAT records shall also be maintained in a dry environment, with storage at least 4 inches above the finished floor, for a period of 25 months following the election. The humidity of the environment shall not exceed 80% humidity for a period of more than 24 hours. V-VPAT records shall be stored in a manner that prevents exposure to light, except as necessary during recounts and audits.
- e. Paper Ballots. Paper ballots shall be maintained in a dry, humidity-controlled environment. The humidity of the environment shall not exceed 80% humidity for a period of more than 24 hours. Additionally, paper ballots shall be stored at least 4 inches above the finished floor, for a period of twenty-five (25) months following the election.
- f. Video Data Records. Video data records shall be maintained in a dry, temperature-controlled environment. The humidity of the environment shall not exceed 80% humidity for a period of more than 24 hours. Temperature settings shall be maintained at a minimum of 40 degrees fahrenheit and a maximum of 80 degrees fahrenheit. Additionally, video data records shall be stored at least 4 inches above the finished floor, for a period of twenty-five (25) months following the election.

#### 43.8.5 Security Cameras or Other Surveillance

43.8.5.1 Unless otherwise instructed, continuous video security surveillance recordings of specified areas shall be made beginning at least sixty (60) days prior to the election and continuing through at least thirty (30) days after the election, unless there is a recount or contest. If a recount or contest occurs, the recording shall continue through the conclusion of all such activity. The following are the specific minimum requirements:

- a. Counties over 50,000 registered voters shall make continuous video security surveillance recordings of the following areas:
  - i. All areas in which election software is used, including but not limited to programming, downloading memory cards, uploading memory cards, tallying results, and results reporting.
  - ii. All areas used for processing absentee ballots, including but not limited to areas used for Signature Verification, tabulation, or storage of voted ballots beginning at least thirty-five (35) days prior to the election and continuing through at least thirty (30) days after the election, unless there is a recount or contest. If a

recount or contest occurs, the recording shall continue through the conclusion of all such activity.

- iii. The storage area for all voting equipment.
- b. Counties under 50,000 registered voters shall make continuous video security surveillance recordings of the following areas:
  - i. All areas in which election software is used, including but not limited to programming, downloading memory cards, uploading memory cards, tallying results, and results reporting.

#### 43.8.6. Equipment Maintenance Procedures

43.8.6.1 In addition to the requirements for voting systems specified in Rule 11, the following minimum standards shall be adhered to:

- a. All equipment shall be stored throughout the year with serially-numbered, tamper-evident seals over the memory card slots for each device. The county shall maintain a log of the seals used for each device consistent to the logs used for tracking Election Day seals.
- b. For equipment being sent to the vendor for offsite repairs/replacements, the county must maintain a log file for the device that shall contain the following: the model number, serial number, and the type of device; the firmware version; the software version (as applicable); date of submission to the vendor.
- c. For equipment receiving maintenance on-site by the vendor, the county shall verify that a CBI background check has been conducted on all vendor personnel with access to any component of the voting system. CBI information shall be updated and maintained on file annually. Additionally, the vendor's representative shall be escorted at all times by an employee while on-site. At no time shall the voting system vendor have access to any component of the voting system without supervision by an employee.
- d. Upon completion of any maintenance, the county shall verify or reinstate the trusted build and conduct a full acceptance test of equipment that shall, at a minimum, include the Hardware Diagnostics test, as indicated in Rule 11, and conduct a mock election in which an employee shall cast a minimum of ten (10) ballots on the device to ensure tabulation of votes is working correctly. All documentation of results of the acceptance testing shall be maintained on file with the specific device.
- e. The Secretary of State shall be required to inspect the counties' maintenance records on a randomly selected one percent (1%) of all voting devices in possession of the counties throughout the state in even-numbered years, and to inspect the maintenance records on a randomly selected five percent (5%) of all voting devices in possession of the counties throughout the state in odd-numbered years.

#### 43.8.7. Transportation of Equipment, Ballot Boxes, and Ballots

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

<i>Test Number</i>
EB1-P3 - 102

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Rule or Statute	2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402	Test Number
45.5.2.1.2(f); 45.5.2.9.9; 14.6.1; 14.6.5; 14.6.6;	<p>The Voting system shall provide for appropriately authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified in this section for procedures for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, and accumulating results as required herein; All optical scan tabulation machines to be used in the recount must be tested prior to the recount, utilizing the procedures set forth in this section. Prior to the recount, the canvass board shall choose at random and test Voting Devices and precinct(s) to be utilized as a test deck for purposes of section 1-10.5-102. The purpose of a test deck is to assure the tabulation machines are counting properly. The precinct chosen shall contain at least 50 ballots. A hand tally shall be conducted of the selected precinct or of a minimum of fifty ballots contained within the selected precinct. A blank prom cartridge, rom cartridge, or memory card shall be utilized for the test deck. The ballots from the selected precinct test deck shall be processed through all scan tabulation machines that will be utilized for the recount. The totals of the recounted contest obtained from the test precinct shall be compared to the hand-tallied total.</p> <p>Totals of recounted ballots shall be processed, counted, and reported in summary form as follows:</p> <p>Sum total of votes cast for each candidate, ballot issue or ballot question subject to the recount, under-votes, and over-votes for all precincts, absentee ballots, early voting locations.</p> <p>Determine the grand total of ballots cast in early, absentee, and precinct voting.</p> <p>If absentee ballots were originally counted with early voting ballots, then the recount will be of a combined total of early and absentee ballots.</p>	EB1-P3-102
<b>Cross Reference 1</b>		<b>Test Date</b> 8-7-07
2005 VVSG 2.1.5, 2.1.5.1a i, 7.9.1b, 7.9.4n, 7.9.7b		<b>Test End Date/Time</b> 8-7-07
<b>Cross Reference 2</b>		<b>Test Type (D/F/B)</b> Functional
2002 VSS 2.3		<b>Eq Type</b> DRE
<b>Cross Reference 3</b>		<b>Equipment Model</b> AccuVote TSX
		<b>Serial number</b> 297695
		<b>Manufacturer</b> Diebold

#### Test Procedure Specification

##### Purpose:

The purpose of this test is to verify that the voting device only allows authorized operators to conduct an election and meet the additional requirements specified herein.

##### Prerequisites:

DB1-P3-108

##### Test Procedures:

DB1-P3-108

##### Variances Used During Testing:

#### Test Expected Outcome

The voting system allows only authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, accumulating.

[illegible]



## Test Log

The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.

[illegible]



[illegible]

Documents		Attachments		Photos	
(list all documents)	No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	(list all videos)	No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	(list all photos)	No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
		Ref DBI-P3-108		Ref. DBI-P3-108	

### Acceptable Compensating Controls

\_\_\_\_\_

Results Summary	Final Test Status
Test meets expected outcome	NP

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisor Approval	
<u>Greice Mathews</u> Printed name		<u>T B. Hoot</u> Printed name		<u>John Gardner</u> Printed name	
<u>[Signature]</u> 8-7-07 Signature Date		<u>[Signature]</u> 8-14-07 Signature Date		<u>[Signature]</u> 8/14/07 Signature Date	

## Additional Observations and Findings

**Observations:**

Reference DB1-P3-108

**Findings:**

Voting System was capable of having an audit conducted ~~on the~~ using the VVPAT tape, and a ~~pre-marked deck~~ premarked deck. Recounted ballots were processed, counted, and reported.

1st Review

Geneice Matthews  
Printed name

Signature

8-7-07  
Date

2nd Review

T. Bishop  
Printed name

Signature

8-14-07  
Date

Supervisor Approval

John Gardner  
Printed name

Signature

8/14/07  
Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EB2-P3 - 201

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2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number
<b>Rule or Statute</b> 45.5.2.1.2(f); 45.5.2.9.9; 14.6.1; 14.6.5; 14.6.6;	The Voting system shall provide for appropriately authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified in this section for procedures for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, and accumulating results as required herein; All optical scan tabulation machines to be used in the recount must be tested prior to the recount, utilizing the procedures set forth in this section. Prior to the recount, the canvass board shall choose at random and test Voting Devices and precinct(s) to be utilized as a test deck for purposes of section 1-10.5-102. The purpose of a test deck is to assure the tabulation machines are counting properly. The precinct chosen shall contain at least 50 ballots. A hand tally shall be conducted of the selected precinct or of a minimum of fifty ballots contained within the selected precinct. A blank prom cartridge, rom cartridge, or memory card shall be utilized for the test deck. The ballots from the selected precinct test deck shall be processed through all scan tabulation machines that will be utilized for the recount. The totals of the recounted contest obtained from the test precinct shall be compared to the hand-tallied total. Totals of recounted ballots shall be processed, counted, and reported in summary form as follows:  Sum total of votes cast for each candidate, ballot issue or ballot question subject to the recount, under-votes, and over-votes for all precincts, absentee ballots, early voting locations.  Determine the grand total of ballots cast in early, absentee, and precinct voting.  If absentee ballots were originally counted with early voting ballots, then the recount will be of a combined total of early and absentee ballots.	EB2-P3-201
<b>Cross Reference 1</b>		<b>Test Date</b>
<b>Cross Reference 2</b>		<b>Test End Date/Time</b>
<b>Cross Reference 3</b>		<b>Test Type (D,F,B)</b>
		<b>Eq Type</b>
	Functional	
	<b>Equipment Model</b>	
	PCOS	
	<b>Serial number</b>	
	<b>Manufacturer</b>	
	Diebold	
<b>Test Procedure Specification</b>		
<div> <div> <b>Purpose:</b>            The purpose of this test is to verify that the voting device only allows authorized operators to conduct an election and meet the additional requirements specified herein.         </div> <div> <b>Prerequisites:</b>            DB2-P3-201         </div> </div>		
<div> <div> <b>Test Procedures:</b>            See Test <del>DB2-P3-201</del> DB2-P3-201 for procedures, and additional documentation.         </div> <div> <b>Variances Used During Testing:</b>            see Variances in Test DB2-P3-201         </div> </div>		
<b>Test Expected Outcome</b>		
The voting system allows only authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, accumulating.		

[illegible]





*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

Continue to next  
page...

### Test Log

[illegible]

## Attachments

*No* ☒

**Yes** ☐

*No* ☒

**Yes** ☐

No ☒

**Yes** ☐

## Acceptable Compensating Controls

### Results Summary

## Test Meets Expected Outcome

### Final Test Status

6

### 1st Review

Jerome Losuto

Printed name

## 2nd Review

T B. 546.1

Printed name \_\_\_\_\_

**Supervisor Approval**

John Gardner

Printed name \_\_\_\_\_

James L. Holt 8/4/07  
Signature Date

**Signature**

8/4/57  
Date

Date \_\_\_\_\_

*Signature*

**Signature**

8-14-07  
Date

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Signature 2/14/07  
Date

**Signature**

<sup>1</sup>*Date*

## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

See Test # DB2-P3-201 for observations.

### Findings:

~~The sum~~  
The precinct counter gave the sum total of votes cast for each candidate, ballot issue/question, undervotes, and overvotes for all precincts, absentee ballots, early voting locations. It also determined the grand total of ballots cast in early, absentee, and precinct voting.

1st Review

Jerome Louvato

Printed name

Jerome Louvato

Signature

8/14/07

Date

2nd Review

T. Bishop

Printed name

T. Bishop

Signature

8-14-07

Date

Supervisor Approval

John Gardner

Printed name

John Gardner

Signature

8/14/07

Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EB2-P3 - 202

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2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number
Rule or Statute 1-5-615(2)	The permanent paper record produced by the electronic or electromechanical voting system shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted for any election in which the system was used.	EB2-P3-202
		Test Date 7-26-07
		Test End Date/Time 7-26-07
Cross Reference 1		Test Type (D.F.B) Functional
		Eq Type PCOS
Cross Reference 2		Equipment Model OS 1.96.6
		Serial number
Cross Reference 3		Manufacturer Diebold
Test Procedure Specification		
<div> <div> <u>Purpose:</u>  <p>The purpose of this test is to verify that the voting system will produce a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.</p> </div> <div> <u>Prerequisites:</u>  <p>Reference test # DB3-P3-303</p> </div> </div>		
<div> <div> <u>Test Procedures:</u>  <p>Reference test # DB3-P3-303</p> </div> <div> <u>Variances Used During Testing:</u>  <p>Reference test # DB3-P3-303</p> </div> </div>		
Test Expected Outcome		
The voting system devices will produce a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.		

[illegible]





## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

[illegible]

Continue to next page...

[illegible]

## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

### Findings:

Voting System device produces a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.

1st Review

Geneice Mothers

Printed name

2nd Review

T Bishop

Printed name

Supervisor Approval

John GARDNER

Printed name

Jan Matt

Signature

7-27-07

Date

T Bishop

Signature

8-14-07

Date

John Gardner

Signature

8/14/07

Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EB3-P3 - 301

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Rule or Statute	2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402	Test Number
45.5.2.1.2(f); 45.5.2.9.9; 14.6.1; 14.6.5; 14.6.6;	<p>The Voting system shall provide for appropriately authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified in this section for procedures for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, and accumulating results as required herein; All optical scan tabulation machines to be used in the recount must be tested prior to the recount, utilizing the procedures set forth in this section. Prior to the recount, the canvass board shall choose at random and test Voting Devices and precinct(s) to be utilized as a test deck for purposes of section 1-10.5-102. The purpose of a test deck is to assure the tabulation machines are counting properly. The precinct chosen shall contain at least 50 ballots. A hand tally shall be conducted of the selected precinct or of a minimum of fifty ballots contained within the selected precinct. A blank prom cartridge, rom cartridge, or memory card shall be utilized for the test deck. The ballots from the selected precinct test deck shall be processed through all scan tabulation machines that will be utilized for the recount. The totals of the recounted contest obtained from the test precinct shall be compared to the hand-tallied total.</p> <p>Totals of recounted ballots shall be processed, counted, and reported in summary form as follows:</p> <p>Sum total of votes cast for each candidate, ballot issue or ballot question subject to the recount, under-votes, and over-votes for all precincts, absentee ballots, early voting locations.</p> <p>Determine the grand total of ballots cast in early, absentee, and precinct voting.</p> <p>If absentee ballots were originally counted with early voting ballots, then the recount will be of a combined total of early and absentee ballots.</p>	EB3-P3-301
Cross Reference 1		Test Date
		Test End Date/Time
Cross Reference 2		Test Type (D, F, B)
		Functional
Cross Reference 3		Eq Type
		CCOS
		Equipment Model
		OS 2.0.12
		Serial number
		Manufacturer
		Diebold

#### Test Procedure Specification

##### Purpose:

The purpose of this test is to verify that the voting device only allows authorized operators to conduct an election and meet the additional requirements specified herein.

##### Prerequisites:

Test DB3-P3-307

##### Test Procedures:

See Test DB3-P3-307 for procedures and additional documentation.

##### Variances Used During Testing:

See Variances in Test DB3-P3-307

#### Test Expected Outcome

The voting system allows only authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, accumulating.







## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

[illegible]

[illegible]

Attachments		
<b>Documents</b> <i>(list all documents)</i>	<b>No</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<b>Yes</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Videos</b> <i>(list all videos)</i>	<b>No</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<b>Yes</b> <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>Photos</b> <i>(list all photos)</i>	<b>No</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<b>Yes</b> <input type="checkbox"/>

### Acceptable Compensating Controls

[illegible]

Results Summary	Final Test Status
Test Meets Expected Outcome	9

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisor Approval	
<u>Serome Lando</u> Printed name		<u>T.B. 5402</u> Printed name		<u>John GARDNER</u> Printed name	
<u>Wm. C. Ruts</u> Signature	<u>8/9/07</u> Date	<u>Tim Binkley</u> Signature	<u>8-14-07</u> Date	<u>[Signature]</u> Signature	<u>8/14/07</u> Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

**Observations:**

See Test # DB3-P3-307 for observations.

**Findings:**

The central counter gave the sum total of votes cast for each candidate, ballot issue/question, undervotes, and overvotes for all precincts, absentee ballots, early voting locations. It also determined the grand total of ballots cast in early, absentee, and precinct voting.

1st Review

Serome Lovato

Printed name

2nd Review

J.B. Sharp

Printed name

Supervisor Approval

John Gardner

Printed name

Samuel L. Zutz

Signature

8/9/07

Date

John B. Sharp

Signature

8-14-07

Date

John Gardner

Signature

8/14/07

Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EB3-P3 - 302

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2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number
Rule or Statute 1-5-615(2)	The permanent paper record produced by the electronic or electromechanical voting system shall be available as an official record for any recount conducted for any election in which the system was used.	EB3-P3-302
		Test Date 8/7
		Test End Date/Time 8/7 9:05A
		Test Type (D.F.B) Functional
		Eq Type CCOS
		Equipment Model OS 2.0.12
		Serial number 40882
		Manufacturer Diebold
Test Procedure Specification		
<div> <div> <u>Purpose:</u>  <p>The purpose of this test is to verify that the voting system will produce a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.</p> </div> <div> <u>Prerequisites:</u>  <p>DD3-P3-301 DELE DIE-IPCOL</p> </div> </div>		
<div> <div> <u>Test Procedures:</u>  <p>USE test voting, setup &amp; DATABASE FROM NOTES IN DD3-P3-301</p> </div> <div> <u>Variances Used During Testing:</u>  <p>N/A</p> </div> </div>		
Test Expected Outcome		
The voting system devices will produce a permanent paper record suitable for conducting a recount.		

## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

[illegible]

## Post Election

EB3-P3 - 302

## Test Log

[illegible]

## Attachments

**Documents**  
(list all documents)

No

1

**Yes**

**Videos**  
(list all videos)

**No**



**Yes**

□

**Photos**  
(list all photos)

No



**Yes**



Deck die IPOL

### Acceptable Compensating Controls

## Results Summary

The Vandy SYSTEM PAPER RECORD IS OF DURABLE QUALITY

PASS (handwritten)

## 1st Review

Michael L. Coughlin  
Printed name

## 2nd Review

T B. SHOP  
Printed name

**Supervisor Approval**

John GARDNER  
Printed name

*Michael G. Chodwell*  
Signature

9.07.07  
Date

*Nis Birney*  
Signature

8-14-07  
Date

  
Signature

8/14/07  
Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

BANKS FOR DIE-1 PCA ARE OF DRASTIC QUALITY AS  
REQUIRED. *Chad*

### Findings:

The Voting System Meets the Requirements. *Chad*

1st Review

*Michael L. Chadwell*

Printed name

2nd Review

*T. Bishop*

Printed name

Supervisor Approval

*John Gardner*

Printed name

*Michael L. Chadwell*

Signature

*8.07.07*

Date

*Tim Bishop*

Signature

*8-14-07*

Date

*John Gardner*

Signature

*8/14/07*

Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

<i>Test Number</i>
EB3-P3 - 303

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<b>Rule or Statute</b>	<b>2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402</b>	<b>Test Number</b>
27.4.2(b)(1)	Sequence of Resolution Procedures for Central Count Optical Scan Procedures are (1) A zero tape shall be run indicating no votes cast or counted before the counting begins.	EB3-P3-303
		<b>Test Date</b>
		8/7
		<b>Test End Date/Time</b>
		8/7 9:15A
<b>Cross Reference 1</b>		<b>Test Type (D,F,B)</b>
		Functional
		<b>Eq Type</b>
		CCOS
<b>Cross Reference 2</b>		<b>Equipment Model</b>
		OS 2.0.12
		<b>Serial number</b>
		40882
<b>Cross Reference 3</b>		<b>Manufacturer</b>
		Diebold

#### Test Procedure Specification

##### Purpose:

The purpose of this test is to verify that the OS unit shall print a zero tape prior to the start of counting votes.

##### Prerequisites:

DB3-P3-312;  
DIEBOLD DECK DE-1RCOL

##### Test Procedures:

OSB setup & test procedures from  
DB3-P3-312, verify zero  
Report is printed.

##### Variances Used During Testing:

#### Test Expected Outcome

The central counting module produces a zero report before counting begins.

## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarting, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

[illegible]





## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

The Voting System is directly connected to GENES. GENES OPERATORS  
CAN PRINT AN ELECTION SUMMARY REPORT PRIOR TO THE START  
OF Counting to verify NO votes have been cast on the device. *Phred*

### Findings:

The Voting System Meets the Requirements. *Phred*

1st Review

Michael L Chadwell  
Printed name

Michael L Chadwell 8.07.07  
Signature Date

2nd Review

T Bishop  
Printed name

T Bishop 8-14-07  
Signature Date

Supervisor Approval

John GARDNER  
Printed name

[Signature] 8/14/07  
Signature Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

CDOS Certification Number: **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

Manufacturer: *Diebold Election Systems*

Application Date: *04/02/2007*

*Test Number*

EB4-P3 - 401

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Rule or Statute	2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402	Test Number
45.5.2.1.2(f); 45.5.2.9.9; 14.6.1; 14.6.5; 14.6.6;	<p>The Voting system shall provide for appropriately authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified in this section for procedures for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, and accumulating results as required herein; All optical scan tabulation machines to be used in the recount must be tested prior to the recount, utilizing the procedures set forth in this section. Prior to the recount, the canvass board shall choose at random and test Voting Devices and precinct(s) to be utilized as a test deck for purposes of section 1-10.5-102. The purpose of a test deck is to assure the tabulation machines are counting properly. The precinct chosen shall contain at least 50 ballots. A hand tally shall be conducted of the selected precinct or of a minimum of fifty ballots contained within the selected precinct. A blank prom cartridge, rom cartridge, or memory card shall be utilized for the test deck. The ballots from the selected precinct test deck shall be processed through all scan tabulation machines that will be utilized for the recount. The totals of the recounted contest obtained from the test precinct shall be compared to the hand-tallied total.</p> <p>Totals of recounted ballots shall be processed, counted, and reported in summary form as follows:</p> <p>Sum total of votes cast for each candidate, ballot issue or ballot question subject to the recount, under-votes, and over-votes for all precincts, absentee ballots, early voting locations.</p> <p>Determine the grand total of ballots cast in early, absentee, and precinct voting.</p> <p>If absentee ballots were originally counted with early voting ballots, then the recount will be of a combined total of early and absentee ballots.</p>	EB4-P3-401
Cross Reference 1		Test Date
Cross Reference 2		Test End Date/Time
Cross Reference 3		Test Type (D/F/B)
		Functional
		Eq Type
		Software
		Equipment Model
		GEMS 1-18-24
		Serial number
		Manufacturer
		Diebold

#### Test Procedure Specification

##### Purpose:

The purpose of this test is to verify that the software module only allows authorized operators to conduct an election and meet the additional requirements specified herein.

##### Prerequisites:

Test #s DB1-P3-101  
DB2-P3-201  
DB3-P3-301  
EB2-P3-201  
EB3-P3-301

##### Test Procedures:

See Test #'s referenced in Prerequisites.

##### Variances Used During Testing:

see Variances in referenced test #'s.

#### Test Expected Outcome

The voting system allows only authorized operators to conduct an election and meet additional requirements as identified for voting, auditing information, inventory control, counting ballots, opening and closing polls, recounts, reporting, accumulating.





## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarding, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

[illegible]



[illegible]

Attachments					
<b>Documents</b> (list all documents)	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Videos</b> (list all videos)	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	<b>Photos</b> (list all photos)	No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>

### Acceptable Compensating Controls

\_\_\_\_\_

Results Summary	Final Test Status
Test Meets Expected Outcome	9

1st Review		2nd Review		Supervisor Approval	
<u>Serome Louito</u> Printed name		<u>T. Bishop</u> Printed name		<u>John Gardner</u> Printed name	
<u>Wm. L. Mays</u> Signature	<u>8/14/07</u> Date	<u>P. Bishop</u> Signature	<u>8-14-07</u> Date	<u>[Signature]</u> Signature	<u>8/14/07</u> Date

## Additional Observations and Findings

**Observations:**

See Test #'s referenced in Prerequisites for observations

**Findings:**

See Findings for Test #'s referenced in Prerequisites

1st Review

Jerome Lovato  
Printed name

Jerome Lovato 8/14/07  
Signature Date

2nd Review

T. Bishop  
Printed name

T. Bishop 8-14-07  
Signature Date

Supervisor Approval

Jim Gardner  
Printed name

[Signature] 8/14/07  
Signature Date

State of Colorado  
Department of State  
1700 Broadway  
Suite 250  
Denver, CO 80290



Mike Coffman  
Secretary of State

Holly Lowder  
Director of Elections

*CDOS Certification Number:* **2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402**

*Manufacturer:* *Diebold Election Systems*

*Application Date:* *04/02/2007*

<i>Test Number</i>
EC3-P3 - 302

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2007-CDOS-DIE-001-0402		Test Number
Rule or Statute 27.4.2(d)(1)	Recount Procedures for Optical Scan for Central Count Optical Scan Procedures include; (1) Optical scan equipment must be set to consistent sensitivity standards for each system type, must be tested prior to the recount, and shall be programmed to sort undervotes for the individual race(s), issue(s) or question(s) being recounted.	EC3-P3-302
Cross Reference 1		Test Date 8/7
Cross Reference 2		Test End Date/Time 8/7 10:00A
Cross Reference 3		Test Type (D,F,B) Functional
		Eq Type CCOS
		Equipment Model OS 2.0.12
		Serial number 40882
		Manufacturer Diebold
Test Procedure Specification		
<div> <div> <b>Purpose:</b>            The purpose of this test is to verify that the OS units will have standard sensitivity standards set as indicated herein.         </div> <div> <b>Prerequisites:</b>            12/2         </div> </div>		
<div> <div> <b>Test Procedures:</b>            VERIFY through programming that all three conditions can be met.         </div> <div> <b>Variances Used During Testing:</b> </div> </div>		
Test Expected Outcome		
Optical scan equipment will allow for calibration and testing prior to recounting. Additionally the device will sort undervotes for individual contests, issues, or questions being recounted.		

## Test Log

*The test log shall contain procedural steps used to conduct and evaluate the tests. At a minimum, these procedural steps shall include any items related to the setup, start, process, measurements, shut down, retarting, stop and restoring the system as necessary.*

Continue to next page...



## Additional Observations and Findings

### Observations:

The Voting System Provides for Sorting (see Attached) and testing the Machines; However the system does not have any sensitivity settings that can be adjusted. Documentation from vendor does not address such a change, and the system does not have administrator functions to do this. And

### Findings:

The system software or associated documentation do not provide for the requirement of sensitivity setting or testing procedure.

1st Review

2nd Review

Supervisor Approval

Michael L. Crowell  
Printed name

T. Bishop  
Printed name

John GARDNER  
Printed name

Michael L. Crowell 8-07-07  
Signature Date

T. Bishop 8-14-07  
Signature Date

[Signature] 8/14/07  
Signature Date



- District
- Report Precinct
- Base Precinct
- Race
- Recall Nunez
- Successor to Nunez
- Header
- Ballot Style
- Ballot
- Card Style
- Card
- Vote Center

Candidate | Base Precinct | Ballot Style | Ballot | Card Style | Card | VoteCenter

Name	Id	Water Gr...
<input checked="" type="radio"/> YES	10	NP
<input type="radio"/> NO	20	NP

Election Options

- Election Info
- Ballots
- Recount

☐ Set For Recount  
Recount Reporting Set  
All Races

OK Cancel Apply Help





- ☐ District
- ☐ Report Precinct
- ☐ Base Precinct
- ☐ Race
- ☐ Header
- ☐ Ballot Style
- ☐ Ballot
- ☐ Card Style
- ☐ Card
- ☐ Vote Center

### District

Label	Id
<UNASSIGNED>	
Jurisdiction Wide	1
State	5
County Wide	10
State Senate	15
State House	20
County Commissioner	
Municipalities	
School District	
Special District	

### AccuVote-05 Options

AccuVote-05 Settings	Server	Reject Settings	Tally Settings
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Return Ballots With. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Print Override Message With. <input type="checkbox"/> Sort Ballots With.		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over Voted Races <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Under Voted Races <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Blank Voted Races <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> All Races Blank Voted <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Cross Over Vote <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over Voted Straight Party <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Invalid Preference Race <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Write-In Votes	

OK Cancel Apply Help