

Andrea Gyger

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2014 11:55 PM
To: sos rulemaking
Subject: CITIZEN SUGGESTIONS

Dear Rulemaking Committee,

I want to acknowledge your efforts to assure that our voting regulations protect the integrity of those citizens entitled to have their voice heard through an honest election process that is to provide the customer service to establish enactment of our 1st Amendment right guaranteed under the U. S. Bill of Rights. Rules & regulations that would allow corruption at the ballot box and the tabulation process is a violation of this, our 1st Amendment and undermine the goal of the Secretary of State's Office & the County Clerk & Records mission for citizen customer service and a violation of your oathe of office if you took an oathe of office. Prudent laws are critical as this represents each citizen's voice.

I would appreciate a confirmation when my suggestions **have been read by this Colorado SOS rulemaking committee.**

1. As the up to 10-year deceased and longer voters have received ballots mailed to an address they never resided when alive, but is sent to the current address for the nearest living kin, even when the next of kin has moved following the death of the deceased, whatever data that the government has that confirms that deceased voter should be removed from the ballot mailing, please do whatever necessary to correct this problem. This committees likely knows the sorts that need to occur, possibly the coronor's office lists must be checked to allow for SOS to remove all the diseased on voter rolls & not be put back on the rolls in any fashion by any parties though a reliable software system. It would appear there are possible software programs that sort for deceased & where living next of kin reside in order to get a ballot to the next of kin of a deceased that need to be extinguished.

2. Since U.S. congressional testimony in 2011-12 by a software expert stated this same testifying expert had written software programs that destroyed itself at the finish of having placed software that decided the outcome of elections. Devvy Kidd, N. California, has written on the similar facts.

The purpose of this rule is to increase confidence in the machine count. The risk-limiting software (RLS) and procedure is a good first step. The procedure we propose is a good second step to help guarantee that **any** unscrupulous changes in the machine count be detected.

The current risk-limiting software randomly selects batches. We recommend that in addition to randomly selected batches, a randomly selected race(s) be completely hand counted.

The risk-limiting procedure/software has the possible flaw that it can be modified to avoid batches that were tampered with. For instance, the RLS could be hacked to deliberately avoid batches that have been tampered with.

By randomly selecting a race to be hand counted, every batch (and therefore, ballot--if a county-wide race is selected) will be examined. Since there is no software involved, the procedure is completely transparent. Since no race is off limits to this procedure, hackers would find it impossible to guarantee that malfeasance would not be detected.

Boulder County cast approximately 90,000 ballots in 2010.

If a randomly selected race is county-wide (as most are), then the question becomes "How long does it take to count 90,000 ballots?"

If each batch averages 150 ballots, then 90,000 ballots is 600 batches.

Assume a modest 25 teams of election judges. Each team would be assigned 24 batches. At the incredibly slow rate of one batch per team per hour, the batches would be completely counted in 3 eight-hour days.

Every ballot would be counted. Every batch would have a count that could be compared to the machine count.

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Every ballot would be counted. Every batch would have a count that could be compared to the machine count. Therefore, has a process of hand counting ballots to confirm electronic results that can be tabulated within days to ONE WEEK of most all elections. I will approximately describe this system that can alert to electronic fraud. , somewhat aThis must be done since digital electronic systems results can be controlled.We must take full responsibility for accurate elections which requires a hand counted ballot system that rules over electronic tabulation. Whatever the system, confirmed, hand counted ballots need to occur with watchers from all parties represented.

Since the goal of customer service is based on reliability of accurate ballot tabulation of those casting ballots, a system that checks the electronic results must be instituted since we must take full responsibility for accurate elections which requires a hand counted ballot system that has precedence because it actually counts the ballots over electronic tabulation.

The integrity that results from this handcount that rules over electronic results will return the respect to our elections and the pride in our civic responsibility.

3. To prevent voter harvesting:

Some have suggested that delivering over 10 ballots by one person, REQUIRE their name, address, zip, phone be given.

My suggestion is to require ALL ballots delivered to an ONLY MANNED ballot drop box by another party, must write legibly on the outside of the envelope that appropriately this information, though possibly worded somewhat differently:

If you are delivering a ballot for anyone other than your own ballot, ALL information is required below & these items need be completed on all lines that are legible for this ballot to be valid.

"Delivered By: Name, address, city, zip, phone and VOTER ID NUMBER required for ALL ballots delivered by 2nd party. Visit www.govotecolorado.com for Voter ID number.

This clearly states what is required so there is no confusion & discourages voter harvesting.

4. No unmanned voter ballot drop-off locations since customer service provides 3 weeks to ballot delivery. USPS can be used for afterhours as needed. Reminder, the highest duty in customer service is for integrity of the ballot for top service, not expediency doing a poor job.

5. As the up to 10-year diseased have received ballots mailed to an address they never resided, but is the current address for the nearest living kin, even when the next of kin have moved following the death of the diseased, the coronor's office lists must be checked to allow for SOS to remove all the diseased on voter rolls & not be put back on the rolls in any fashion by any parties. It would appear there are possible sorts of diseased & where living next of kin reside in order to get a ballot to the next of kin of a diseased.

6. Voter signature verification required.

7. Voter Privacy:

Since 90%+ voted for Hitler because of the pressure to vote for him because their ballots were not private & they knew they would be threatened if they didn't vote for Hitler this illustrates that ballots

MUST be secret through the entire tabulation process so that no party/parties pressure a voter since this infringes on our FIRST AMENDMENT in the Bill of Rights.

Best procedure would be to turn in your ballot with NO number on it except precinct identification. At the Clerk's office all ballots get a unique number not identified with the voter, then ballots proceed for the tally by computer then verification by hand. This could be adjusted in some way if need be, but essentially no voter number on the mailed ballot. This could dispense with privacy sleeve.

I look forward to knowing that this committee ensures election standards that provides the customer service that ensures our ballots are private, accurately tabulated so all citizen's know only one citizen, one vote is allowed to get through the system.

I also look forward to getting your response to my suggestions so we have a dialogue on these critical issues.

Sincerely,

Mary Tuneberg, Westminster, Co.

