

Rule 20. County Security Procedures

- 20.1 The county must submit its annual security plan on the form prescribed by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 1-5-616(5), C.R.S. A county must also submit a comprehensive procedure for ballot delivery in an emergency under section 1-7.5-115(1), C.R.S.
- 20.2 General requirements concerning chain-of-custody
- 20.2.1 The county must maintain on file all documentation of seals, chain-of-custody, and other documents related to the transfer of equipment between parties. These documents are subject to inspection by the Secretary of State.
- 20.2.2 The county must maintain and document uninterrupted chain-of-custody for each voting device from the installation of trusted build to the present, throughout the county's ownership or leasing of the device. For optical scanners approved for use under section 1-5-613(2), C.R.S. but for which no trusted build exists, the county must maintain and document uninterrupted chain-of-custody for each voting device from the successful completion of acceptance testing conducted according to Rule 20.8.4.
- 20.2.3 Only election officials or canvass board members sworn under oath are allowed to handle ballots, which include VVPAT records.
- 20.2.4 The county may install additional or modified software developed by the vendor on any component of the voting system only if the software is specifically listed on the Secretary of State's certificate and verified against the state trusted build. Nothing in this Rule precludes the use of commercial off-the-shelf software, provided that the software is included in the certified list of services and executables for the certified voting systems.
- 20.2.5 Any form or log containing "date" means to note the month, calendar day, year, hour, minute, and whether the time is a.m. or p.m.
- 20.2.6 The county must submit sample copies of all referenced forms, schedules, logs, and checklists with the security plan.
- 20.3 Physical locking mechanisms and seals. The county must record the serial number of every seal on the appropriate chain-of-custody log. Two individuals must verify, and indicate by signing and dating the log, that the seal serial numbers match the logged serial numbers. If a seal is inaccessible and cannot be removed, then it is not necessary to verify that seal serial number.
- 20.3.1 DREs, BMDs, and Judge's Booth Controllers (JBCs)
- (a) The county must place a seal over a removable card or cartridge that is inserted into the unit, or over the slot or door covering the card or cartridge.
- (b) The county must place a seal over any removable card slot or cartridge slot when no card or cartridge is inserted into the unit.
- (c) If the county cannot verify the firmware or software hash value (MD5 or SHA-1), the county must seal the DRE case. To detect unauthorized access, the county must use seals at either the seams of the case or at key entry points such as screw access points.
- (d) If the voting device contains one or more slots for a flash memory card, the county must affix a seal over each flash card slot, door, or access panel.

- (e) In each voter service and polling center, the county must provide a minimum of one accessible DRE with a headset that has adjustable volume control.

20.3.2 Before attaching a VVPAT to a specific voting device, the county must seal the unit after verifying that no votes were cast. At least two election officials must verify that seals are intact before the start of voting, and at the close of voting. VVPAT records must either remain in the VVPAT canister, or be sealed and secured in a suitable device for protecting privacy or as described in Rule 20.11.

20.3.3 Optical scanners

- (a) The county must place a seal over each card or cartridge inserted into the unit, or over any door or slot containing the card or cartridge.
- (b) The county must place a seal over each empty card or cartridge slot or door covering the area where the card or cartridge is inserted.
- (c) Before the start of voting and after the close of voting, two election officials must visually confirm that all seals are intact and that the seal numbers match those logged in the chain-of-custody log.

20.3.4 Memory cards or cartridges

- (a) The county must assign and securely affix a permanent serial number to each removable card or cartridge. The county may use the manufacturer assigned serial number for this purpose.
- (b) The county must handle removable memory cards and cartridges in a secure manner at all times. The county must transfer and store any removable card or cartridge that is not sealed in a voting machine in a secure container with at least one seal. Upon delivery and receipt, election judges or county personnel must verify, and indicate by signing and dating the chain-of custody log, that all seal numbers match those listed in the log.
- (c) The county must maintain a written or electronic log to record card or cartridge seal numbers and track seals for each voting unit.

20.4 Individuals with access to keys, door codes, and vault combinations

20.4.1 For employees with access to areas addressed in Rule 20.4.3, the county must state in the security plan each employee's title and the date of the criminal background check was performed. [Section 24-72-305.6, C.R.S.]

20.4.2 The county must change all keypad door codes or locks, vault combinations, computer and server passwords, encryption key codes, and administrator passwords at least once per calendar year prior to the first election of the year.

20.4.3 Employee access. The county may grant employees access to the codes, combinations, passwords, and encryption keys described in this Rule in accordance with the following limitations:

- (a) Access to the code, combination, password, or encryption key for the voting equipment, ballot storage areas, counting room, or tabulation workstations is restricted to employees who have successfully passed a criminal background check. Any person who has been convicted of an election offense or an offense

with an element of fraud is prohibited from having access to a code, combination, password, or encryption key for the voting equipment, ballot storage areas, counting room, or tabulation workstations.

- (b) Except for emergency personnel, no other individuals may be present in these locations unless supervised by one or more employees. Each individual who has access to the central election management system or central tabulator must have their own unique username and password. No individual may use any other individual's username or password. Shared accounts are prohibited.
- (c) In extreme circumstance, the county may request and the Secretary of State may grant exemption from the requirements outlined in this Rule.

20.4.5 Access to where election management software is used is limited to authorized election officials and watchers only. Messengers or runners delivering ballots between the preparation room and computer room must wear distinguishing identification.

20.5 Internal Controls for the Voting System

20.5.1 The county must enable, create, and use passwords.

20.5.2 In addition to the access controls discussed in Rule 20.4, the county must change all passwords and limit access to the following areas:

- (a) The county must change all software passwords once per calendar year prior to the first election. This includes any boot or startup passwords in use, as well as any administrator and user passwords and remote device passwords.
- (b) The county must change all hardware passwords once per calendar year prior to the first election. This includes any encryption keys, key card tools, supervisor codes, poll worker passwords on smart cards, USB keys, tokens, and voting devices themselves as it applies to the specific system.
- (c) Administrative and user accounts for election management system and election databases.
 - (1) The county may use the administrative user account only to create individual user accounts for each election database.
 - (2) The county must create individual user accounts that are associated and identified with each individual authorized user of the election management system or election database.
 - (3) The county must restrict access to each individual user account with a unique password known only to each individual user. Authorized users must access the election management system and election database using his or her individual user account and unique password.
 - (4) The county may grant administrative privileges to no more than ten individual user accounts per election.
- (d) Other than for the purpose of programming the election, the voting system provider may not have administrative or user access to the county's election management system.

- (e) The county may not connect or allow a connection of any voting system component to the Internet.
- (f) If any component of the voting system is equipped with Wi-Fi capability or a wireless device, the county must disable the wireless capability or device.
- (g) The county may not connect any component of the voting system to another device by modem.
- (h) The county must include in its security plan the title and date of background checks for each employee with access to any of the areas or equipment set forth in this Rule. The county must maintain a storage facility access log that details employee name, date, and time of access to the storage facility in which the software, hardware, or components of any voting system are maintained. If access to the storage facility is controlled by use of key card or similar door access system that is capable of producing a printed paper log including the person's name and date and time of entry, such a log must meet the requirements of this Rule. [Section 24-72-305.6, C.R.S.]

20.6 The county must keep all components of the voting system, ballots, servers, workstations, DREs, optical scanners, BMDs, VVPAT records, and video data records in a temperature-controlled storage environment that maintains a minimum temperature of 50 degrees Fahrenheit and a maximum temperature of 90 degrees Fahrenheit. The storage environment must be dry with storage at least four inches above the floor. The county must provide the Secretary of State with a description of the specific environment used for each type of component.

20.7 Security cameras or other surveillance

20.7.1 The county must maintain a log of each person who enters the areas specified in Rule 20.7.3, including the person's name, signature, and date and time of entry. If access to the specified areas is controlled by use of key card or similar door access system that is capable of producing a printed paper log including the person's name and date and time of entry, the log must meet the requirements of this Rule.

20.7.2 Unless otherwise instructed, the county must make video security surveillance recordings of the areas specified in Rule 20.7.3 beginning at least 60 days before election day and continuing through at least 30 days after election day. If a recount or contest occurs, the recording must continue through the conclusion of all related activity. The recording system must ensure that records are not written over when the system is full. The recording system must provide a method to transfer the video records to a different recording device or to replace the recording media. If replaceable media is used then the county must provide a process that ensures that the media is replaced often enough to prevent periods when recording is not available.

20.7.3 The following are the specific minimum requirements:

- (a) If the county has 50,000 or more registered voters, then the county must maintain a log and make video security surveillance recordings of the following areas, excluding voting booths:
 - (1) All areas in which election management software is used, including but not limited to programming, downloading memory cards, uploading memory cards, tallying results, and results reporting.

- (2) All areas used for processing ballots, including but not limited to areas used for Signature Verification, tabulation, or storage of voted ballots beginning at least 35 days before election day and continuing through at least 30 days after election day, unless there is a recount or contest. If a recount or contest occurs, the recording must continue through the conclusion of all related activity.
 - (3) The storage area for all voting equipment.
 - (b) If the county has fewer than 50,000 registered voters then the county must maintain a log and make video security surveillance recordings of all areas in which election management software is used, including but not limited to programming, downloading memory cards, uploading memory cards, tallying results, and results reporting.
 - (c) The county must adequately light the area(s) subject to video surveillance to provide visibility for video recording.
- 20.8 Equipment maintenance procedures. In addition to the requirements for voting systems inventory specified in Rule 11.2, the county must adhere to the following minimum standards:
- 20.8.1 The county must store all equipment throughout the year with seals over the memory card slots for each device. The county must maintain a log of the seals used for each device consistent to the logs used for tracking Election Day seals.
 - 20.8.2 For equipment being sent to the vendor for offsite repairs/replacements, the county must keep a maintenance log for the device that must contain the following: the model number, serial number, and the type of device; the firmware version; the software version, as applicable; the printed name and signature of the person sending the equipment; and the date of submission to the vendor.
 - 20.8.3 An employee must escort the vendor's representative at all times while on-site. At no time may the voting system vendor have access to any component of the voting system without supervision by an employee. [Section 24-72-305.6, C.R.S.]
 - 20.8.4 Upon completion of any maintenance, the county must verify or reinstate the trusted build and conduct a full acceptance test of equipment that must, at a minimum, include the hardware diagnostics test, as indicated in Rule 11, and a mock election in which an employee(s) must cast a minimum of five ballots on the device to ensure tabulation of votes is working correctly. The county must maintain all documentation of the results of the acceptance testing on file with the specific device.
 - 20.8.5 The Secretary of State will annually inspect county maintenance and chain-of-custody records and verify the integrity of trusted build on a randomly selected basis.
- 20.9 Transportation of equipment, memory cards, ballot boxes, and ballots
- 20.9.1 The county must submit detailed plans to the Secretary of State before an election regarding the transportation of equipment and ballots both to remote voting sites and back to the central elections office or storage facility. If there is any evidence of possible tampering with a seal, or if the serial numbers do not match those listed in the chain-of-custody log, the county clerk must be immediately notified and must follow the procedures specific to the incident as described in Rule 20.13. While the method of transportation of equipment may vary, the following standards apply:

- (a) Transportation by county personnel. County personnel must at all times display identification provided by the County. Two employee signatures and date are required at the departure location verifying that the equipment, including memory card or cartridge, is sealed to prevent tampering. Upon delivery of equipment, at least two election officials must verify, and indicate by signing and dating the chain-of-custody log, that all seals are intact and that the serial numbers on the seals match the logged serial numbers.
- (b) Transportation by election judges. Election officials that are receiving equipment must inspect all components of voting devices and verify the specific numbers by signature and date on the chain-of-custody log for the device.
- (c) Transportation by contract. If a county contracts for the delivery of equipment to remote voting locations, each individual delivering equipment must successfully pass a criminal background check. Any person who has been convicted of an election offense or an offense with an element of fraud is prohibited from handling or delivering voting equipment. Two election officials must verify, sign, and date the chain-of-custody log upon release of the equipment to the individual(s) delivering the equipment.

20.9.2 Standards for transporting voting equipment to and from the voting location:

- (a) Required procedures if memory cards or cartridges are removed from voting devices at remote voting locations:
 - (1) Before removing a memory card or cartridge, two election officials must inspect and verify that all seals on the device are intact and that the serial numbers on the seals match those listed on the chain-of-custody log. Both election officials must sign and date the chain-of-custody log before breaking the seal.
 - (2) Election officials must place the memory cards or cartridges in a sealable transfer case and must seal the case. The election officials must maintain a chain-of-custody log for the transfer case of the memory cards or cartridges.
 - (3) Election officials must place new seals over the empty memory card/cartridge slot and door and document the seal numbers used.
 - (4) At least two election officials must accompany the transfer case to the processing location. The election officials who receive the equipment must verify, and indicate by signing and dating the chain-of-custody log, that the seals are intact and seal serial numbers match those listed in the log.
 - (5) Election officials transporting secured voting equipment must maintain chain-of-custody logs.
- (b) Required procedures if devices are delivered with memory cards/cartridges intact:
 - (1) Two election officials must verify that all seals are intact at the close of polls. Election judges must sign and date the chain-of-custody log with such indication.

- (2) At least two election officials must accompany the secured equipment to the drop-off location. The person receiving the equipment must verify the seals and sign and date the logs.
- (3) Upon confirmation that the seals are intact and bear the correct numbers, election officials must remove and upload the memory cards/cartridges into the central count system.
- (4) To secure the equipment, election officials must place a tamper-evident seal over the memory card slot and update the chain-of-custody log to reflect the new seal number(s).

20.9.3 Required procedures for transportation of ballot boxes:

- (a) A bipartisan team, of election judges and/or staff, must seal all ballot boxes that contain voted ballots so that no person can access the ballots without breaking a seal. The team must record all seals in the chain-of-custody log, verify that the required seals are intact, and sign and date the log.
- (b) A bipartisan team, of election judges and/or staff, must accompany all ballot boxes that contain voted ballots at all times, except when the ballot box is located in a vault or secure physical location.
- (c) The ballot box exchange requirements of section 1-7-305, C.R.S., are met if a chain-in-custody log is completed for each ballot box.
- (d) If a seal is broken or chain-of-custody is unverifiable, the county clerk must investigate, document his or her findings, and report the incident to the Secretary of State, as appropriate.

20.9.4 Ballot security at a voter service and polling center

- (a) The county must secure unvoted paper ballots during pre-election storage, transportation, and at polling locations.
 - (1) Except when election judges are actively issuing ballots the ballot containers must be sealed and secure.
 - (2) The county must maintain chain-of-custody logs for all ballot containers,
- (b) Unvoted paper ballots must be transported to polling locations in sealed containers. The county clerk must record the seal number on a chain-of-custody log for verification by the receiving election judges. The receiving election judges must verify the ballot container seal number before issuing ballots.
- (c) When election judges are actively issuing ballots, the unvoted ballots must be in clear view of a minimum of two election judges of different party affiliations and one of the election judges must actively monitor the ballots unless the ballots are stored in a locked location accessible only to election officials.
- (d) A minimum of two election judges of different party affiliations must reconcile and document all unvoted, issued, and spoiled paper ballots at the end of each day the polling center is open, and immediately report any inventory discrepancies to the county clerk.

- (e) If unvoted paper ballots are stored overnight at the polling location, the ballots must be sealed in containers and stored in a locked location accessible only to election officials.

20.10 Contingency plans

20.10.1 The county must develop emergency contingency plans for voting equipment and voting locations in accordance with this Rule.

20.10.2 In the event of a serious or catastrophic equipment failure, or when equipment is removed from service, or there is not adequate backup equipment to meet the requirements of section 1-5-501, C.R.S., the county must notify the Secretary of State that the county is using provisional ballots as an emergency voting method.

20.10.3 The county contingency plans and evacuation procedures must address emergency situations including fire, severe weather, bomb threat, civil unrest, electrical blackout, equipment failure, and any other emergency situations the county identifies.

20.10.4 The county must develop procedures to address failures of SCORE continuity, which includes:

- (a) Network failure,
- (b) Power failure that lasts less than one hour, and
- (c) Power failure that lasts more than one hour.

20.11 Procedures for voter verifiable paper record (VVPAT). The following requirements apply only to DREs with a VVPAT.

20.11.1 Security. The VVPAT record is considered an official record of the election, in accordance with section 1-5-802, C.R.S.

- (a) The housing unit for any VVPAT record to be used in the election must be sealed and secured before any votes are cast for the election. Election officials must attest to the VVPAT record having no votes included on the paper record before the start of voting, and before the installation or replacement of a new VVPAT record. Documentation of the seal number(s) must be maintained before voting and at the conclusion of voting.
- (b) If a DRE with VVPAT is used at a voter service and polling center, the seal number(s) must be recorded at the beginning and end of each voting day.
- (c) At the close of the polls, the VVPAT records will be transferred to the election office in the same manner as any paper ballots. In the absence of paper ballots, the VVPAT records will be transferred to the election office in the same manner as memory cards.
- (d) If the DRE's trusted build is not capable of verification by reference to the hash value (MD5 or SHA-1) of the firmware or software, the county must secure the printer port on the DRE with tamper-evident seals when the VVPAT is not connected to the DRE's printer port.

20.11.2 Anonymity. The designated election official must implement measures to protect the anonymity of voters choosing to vote on DREs.

- (a) Measures to protect anonymity include:
 - (1) The county may not keep any record indicating the order in which people voted on the DRE, or which VVPAT record is associated with the voter.
 - (2) When more than one DRE is available at a voting location, the county must, to the extent practicable, allow the voter to choose the DRE he or she wishes to vote on.
- (b) The county clerk may not release a report generated from SCORE that includes a date and time stamp that could potentially identify a voter who cast a specific ballot.
- (c) At no time may an election official simultaneously access a VVPAT and the list of voters. If the VVPAT record requires inspection, at least two election officials must conduct the examination.
- (d) The county must arrange voter service and polling center DREs in a manner that prevents election officials and other voters from observing how a DRE voter marks or casts his or her ballot.

20.11.3 Storage. The storage of the VVPAT records must be consistent with storage of paper ballots under section 1-7-802, C.R.S.

- (a) Individual spools containing VVPAT records must contain the following catalog information affixed to the spool:
 - (1) Date and name of election;
 - (2) Name of voting location;
 - (3) Date(s) and time(s) of voting;
 - (4) Machine serial number of DRE associated with the record; and
 - (5) Number of spools associated with this machine for this election (i.e. "Spool 1 of 1", or "Spool 1 of 2", etc.).
- (b) Light sensitive storage containers must be used for the 25 month storage period to ensure the integrity of the VVPAT paper record. Containers must be sealed, with record of the seal numbers maintained on file and signed by two election officials.

20.12 Security training for election officials. The county must include in its security plan the details of its security training. The county must address the anticipated time of training, location of training, and number of election officials receiving the security training, as it applies to the following requirements:

20.12.1 The county must conduct a separate training module for field technicians and election officials responsible for overseeing the transportation and use of the voting systems, picking up supplies, and troubleshooting device problems throughout the Election Day.

20.12.2 Security training must include the following components:

- (a) Proper application and verification of seals and chain-of-custody logs;

- (b) How to detect tampering with voting equipment, memory cards/cartridges, or election data on the part of anyone coming in contact with voting equipment, including election officials, vendor personnel, or voters;
- (c) Ensuring privacy in voting booths;
- (d) VVPAT requirements;
- (e) Chain-of-custody requirements for voting equipment, memory cards/cartridges, and other election materials;
- (f) Ballot security;
- (g) Voter anonymity; and
- (h) Recognition and reporting of security incidents.

20.13 Remedies

20.13.1 If a seal is broken, or there is another discrepancy, the election official must immediately notify the county, who must remedy the discrepancy as follows:

- (a) The county or Secretary of State must reinstate or verify the trusted build. For instances where the county can display, verify, or print the hash value (MD5 or SHA-1) of the firmware or software, the election official must document and verify that the hash value matches the documented alphanumeric string associated with the trusted build for the software or firmware of that device.
- (b) If the evidence indicates that the discrepancy occurred before the start of voting:
 - (1) The election officials must seal the device and securely deliver it to the county.
 - (2) The county or the Secretary of State must install a new, secure memory card into the device, conduct a hardware diagnostics test as prescribed in Rule 11, and conduct an acceptance test on the machine in full election mode, casting at least 25 ballots on the device. The county must maintain on file all documentation of testing and chain-of-custody for each specific device.
 - (3) The county must complete the necessary seal process and documentation to re-establish the chain-of-custody for the device and new memory card.
 - (4) The county must set the machine to election mode ready for a zero report.
- (c) If the evidence indicates that the discrepancy occurred after votes were cast on the device:
 - (1) The county may not continue to use the machine until verification or reinstallation of trusted build and acceptance testing is complete. The county must set the machine to election mode ready for a zero report before resuming voting on the device.

- (2) The election officials must seal the device and securely deliver it to the county.
- (3) The county must close the election on that device, and perform a complete manual verification of the paper ballots (or VVPAT records) to the summary tape printed on the device that represents the record of votes on the memory card.
- (4) If the totals do not match then only the paper record will be accepted as the official results for that device. The county must re-seal and secure the device and immediately report the discrepancy to the Secretary of State. The county must not use the device for the remainder of the election unless the trusted build is reinstated.
- (5) If the totals match, the county may upload the memory card into the election management software at the close of polls.
- (6) After verifying the totals, the county must secure the paper records and memory card with seals and a chain-of-custody log.
- (7) The county must complete the necessary seal process and documentation to establish the chain-of-custody for the device and memory card.
- (8) Before certifying election results, the county must conduct a full (all contests) random audit on the device under Rule 25.3 and report results to the Secretary of State. This requirement is in addition to the post-election audit required by Rule 25.2 or 25.3.

20.13.2 The county must make all documentation related to the voting system and for every device used in the election available for Secretary of State inspection.

20.14 Amendments and review of security plans

20.14.1 If no changes have occurred since the last security plan was filed then the county must file a statement to that effect.

20.14.2 The county must clearly identify and describe any revisions to a previously filed security plan.

20.14.3 The county may change the security plan within 60 days of an election as a result of an emergency situation or other unforeseen circumstance. The county must document the changes and file the revisions with the Secretary of State within five days of the change.

20.15 Lease, loan, or rental of election equipment. Nothing in this Rule requires a county to lease, loan, or rent any election equipment to any municipality, special district or other local jurisdiction.

20.15.1 A county that chooses to lease, loan, or rent any certified election equipment to a municipality, special district, or other local jurisdiction for use in their elections must maintain or reestablish an acceptable chain-of-custody and appropriate documentation in accordance with Rule 20.2.

20.15.2 Upon return of the voting equipment to the county, if the documentation and chain-of-custody does not support the proper maintenance of the trusted build software then the county must reinstate or verify the trusted build before using the equipment.

20.15.3 To reinstate or verify the trusted build, the county must implement one of the following procedures:

- (a) The county clerk must:
 - (1) Deliver the equipment to the jurisdiction;
 - (2) Witness and document the installation of the memory card(s) or cartridge(s) used by the jurisdiction;
 - (3) Place one or more secure and numbered seals on the voting equipment in accordance with Rule 20.3. If during the course of the jurisdiction's election, the designated election official requires removal of a memory card or cartridge as a function of the election process, the county clerk must witness and document the removal and proper resealing of the memory card or cartridge; and
 - (4) Upon return of the equipment to the county, the county must verify, and indicate by signing and dating the chain-of-custody log, that all seals are intact. If any seal is damaged or removed, the county must reinstate or verify the trusted build.
- (b) The county must designate and station deputized county staff with the loaned equipment at all times while the equipment is under control of the designated election official. The deputized county staff must maintain physical custody of the equipment at all times to ensure that no unauthorized access occurs.
- (c) In accordance with section 1-5-605.5, C.R.S., the county must appoint the designated election official as a deputy for the purposes of supervising the voting equipment. The designated election official must:
 - (1) Sign and submit to the county an affirmation that he or she will ensure the security and integrity of the voting equipment at all times;
 - (2) Affirm that the use of the voting equipment is conducted in accordance with this Rule 20 the specific Conditions for Use of the voting equipment; and
 - (3) Agree to maintain all chain-of-custody logs for the voting device(s).

20.16 Ballot on demand

20.16.1 The county must use the state-provided laptop for ballot on demand purposes only.

20.16.2 Software access, security, and storage.

- (a) The county must change all Windows and ballot on demand application passwords at least once per calendar year.
- (b) Only election officials or authorized vendor representatives may operate the ballot on demand system.
- (c) The county may connect the ballot on demand laptop to an external network for the purpose of connecting to SCORE only if the county maintains current virus

protection, current operating system security patches, and implements firewalls to prevent unauthorized access.

- (d) The county must store the state-provided laptop and unused paper ballot stock in a locked storage area when the printer is not in use.

20.16.3 Ballot reconciliation

- (a) The county must reconcile ballots printed on demand in accordance with Rules 10.1.1 and 10.1.2.
- (b) The county must maintain damaged, misprinted, or unusable ballots as election records.

20.17 Voting system conditions for use

20.17.1 The county must use the voting system only on a closed network or in a standalone fashion.

20.17.2 Access logs.

- (a) In addition to the audit logs generated by the election management system, the county must maintain access logs that record the following:
 - (1) The date, time, and user's name for each instance that a user enters or exits the system or the system's report printing functions; and
 - (2) Modifications to the system's hardware, including insertion or removal of removable storage media, or changes to hardware drivers.
- (b) The county may create and maintain the access logs in the manner the county deems most suitable, including key stroke recording software, video surveillance recordings, manually or electronically written records, or a combination of these methods.

20.17.3 The county must create a backup copy of the election setup records on a read-only, write-once electronic storage media, immediately after completing the Logic and Accuracy Test.

- (a) The county must identify the master database name and date of election on the label of the backup.
- (b) The county must store the backup in a sealed container. Two election officials of different party affiliations must sign and date entries to the chain-of-custody log for the sealed container.

20.17.4 DREs

- (a) The county's election judges must:
 - (1) Test the VVPAT printer immediately after changing the VVPAT paper; and
 - (2) Lock and re-seal the VVPAT canister, and make appropriate entries on the VVPAT chain-of-custody log, before voting resumes on the DRE.

- (b) At least one DRE in each voter service and polling center must have a backup battery, or be connected to an uninterruptible power supply, sufficient to sustain continuous operation for a minimum of two hours in the event of power loss.
- (c) The county must maintain logs indicating administrator function use.

20.17.5 Optical scanners:

- (a) When issuing ballots, the county must provide in-person voters with a secrecy sleeve sufficient to conceal a voter's marked ballot from others in the polling location, including election officials.
- (b) The county must record the optical scanner serial number on all chain-of-custody logs and reports generated by the device.
- (c) Each optical scanner must have a backup battery, or be connected to an uninterruptible power supply sufficient to sustain continuous operation for a minimum of two hours in the event of power loss.
- (d) The county must maintain logs indicating administrator function use.
- (e) The county must program each optical scanner to permit an election judge to override rejection of overvoted ballots that cannot be duplicated in accordance with Rule 18.

20.18 ES&S voting system conditions

20.18.1 If the county must provide language minority assistance under section 203 of the Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1), it may not use an ES&S voting system.

20.18.2 DREs. The county may only use the nine inch screen on the VVPAT.

20.18.3 For optical scanners with a zip disk drive, the county must save the cast vote records for each batch of tabulated ballots to a zip disk. A batch of tabulated ballots may consist of one or more SCORE absentee ballot batches.

20.19 Hart DRE conditions. If a county shortens a lengthy candidate name on the VVPAT, it must provide printed notice of the change to voters at the voter service and polling center.

20.20 Sequoia DRE conditions

20.20.1 The county must add clarifying text to the display screen during the VVPAT review process that instructs the voter to review his or her ballot choices.

20.20.2 The county must lock the activate button to prevent its use during an election.

20.20.3 A county may not modify the screen display using an override.ini file without approval from the Secretary of State.