



## **Simplified Risk Limiting Audit (RLA) Procedures County Role (Denver)**

### **Pre-Election**

- The RLA needs to be integrated with the Public Logic and Accuracy Test (LAT) to ensure that the Post-Election RLA will be successful.
  - Perhaps prior to the Public LAT the mCVRs from a complete test deck should be sent to the SOS office so that they can be QC'd for integration into a utility that will be used by the state to randomly select ballots for an RLA. Once the mCVRs have been successfully integrated into the SOS utility we could conduct this test RLA on the day of the Public LAT in addition to the steps outlined in rule 11.3.2.

### **Tabulation of Ballots**

- Counting of ballots begins. (15 days prior to election day)
  - Scanning procedures will ensure that the order of the ballots is maintained so that each ballot will be retrievable during the RLA. Once a batch of ballots has been scanned they are placed back into the transfer case they arrived in. The case is resealed and placed in storage.
- If a ballot required Duplication, it is logged on the transfer case label and sent through the duplication process where it is logged so the original and duplicate ballot can be matched up later.
- Ballot images that are sent to adjudication will be audited to ensure that the bi-partisan teams are following the Secretary of States intent guide. Batches will be heavily audited at the onset of scanning but the auditing will taper down as election day approaches due to time constraints in reporting of results.

### **Post-Election Day**

- Scanning and Tabulation of ballots completed (8<sup>th</sup> day after election day).
- Provide Machine Cast Vote Records created by the tabulation system (mCVR) to Secretary of States (SOS) office (COB 8<sup>th</sup> day after election day).
- Receive report from SOS office of randomized ballots to pull and races to audit.
- Create manual Audit Cast Vote Record (CVRs created from ballots that were scanned by the voting system and not sent to duplication, aCVR) and Audit Originally Cast Vote Records (CVRs created from original ballots, not the duplicated ballot that was scanned, in the duplication process, aoCVR) (COB 9<sup>th</sup> day after election day).
  - This step is completed under the scrutiny of the county appointed bi-partisan audit board.
- Provide SOS office both aCVRs and aoCVRs or report back to SOS that each CVR matched/didn't match the manually created ones (17<sup>th</sup> day after election day, ideally this day could be extended in the event of an extensive audit).



## Deliberation Points & Assumptions

- Batch size should be determined by county as each county has different procedures and equipment. However, the batch size needs to be manageable for the conduct of an RLA. Perhaps a best practices group for different county sizes and equipment is in order.
  - A best practices group could also help determine if a county would benefit from imprinting and when in the process to imprint a unique number on each ballot.
- Because one of the requirements is for each county to Canvass their election prior to certification of results, the mCVR contains enough information to forgo the creation of an additional ballot manifest report. Specifically, in Denver, each ballot is essentially canvassed and tracked outside of the tabulation system. Therefore, when a batch has a discrepant total from the previous processing rooms there is an escalation procedure in place to determine why that total differed from the previous processes reports.
- For the coordination of statewide and state coordinated contests, a centralized audit center hosted by the SOS is definitely needed. However, the utility the centralized audit center uses should be available for local and municipal elections that are not coordinated by the SOS.
- How would we conduct an RLA on an election with multiple cards? This is a likely scenario, at least in Denver, for the 2017 Coordinated Election due to the potential ballot content. The Dominion system recognizes each card as a “ballot”, that is, it will create a CVR for each card scanned in the system, not a consolidated CVR for each ballot scanned. The random sampling would need to adjust for CVRs that do not have the contests selected for the audit. As the CVRs have this data it should be fairly straightforward.